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Security Transport Layer Security network transparency tls blockchain A format that supports the logging information about the secrets used in a TLS connection is described. Recording secrets to a file in SSLKEYLOGFILE format allows diagnostic and logging tools that use this file to decrypt messages exchanged by TLS endpoints. About This Document The latest revision of this draft can be found at . Status information for this document may be found at . Discussion of this document takes place on the Transport Layer Security Working Group mailing list (), which is archived at . Subscribe at . Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at .

Introduction Debugging or analyzing protocols can be challenging when TLS is used to protect the content of communications. Inspecting the content of encrypted messages in diagnostic tools can enable more thorough analysis. Over time, multiple TLS implementations have informally adopted a file format that logging the secret values generated by the TLS key schedule. In many implementations, the file that the secrets are logged to is specified in an environment variable named "SSLKEYLOGFILE", hence the name of SSLKEYLOGFILE format. Note the use of "SSL" as this convention originally predates the adoption of TLS as the name of the protocol. This document describes the SSLKEYLOGFILE format. This format can be used for TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 . The format also supports earlier TLS versions, though use of earlier versions is forbidden . This format can also be used with DTLS , QUIC , and protocols that also use the TLS key schedule. Use of this format could complement other protocol-specific logging such as QLOG .

Applicability Statement The artifact that this document describes - if made available to entities other than endpoints - completely undermines the core guarantees that TLS provides. This format is intended for use in systems where TLS only protects test data. While the access that this information provides to TLS connections can be useful for diagnosing problems while developing systems, this mechanism MUST NOT be used in a production system.

Conventions and Definitions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

The SSLKEYLOGFILE Format A file in SSLKEYLOGFILE format is a text file. This document specifies the character encoding as UTF-8 . Though the format itself only includes ASCII characters , comments MAY contain other characters. Though Unicode is permitted in comments, the file MUST NOT contain a unicode byte order mark (U+FEFF). Lines are terminated using the line ending convention of the platform on which the file is generated. Tools that process these files MUST accept CRLF (U+13 followed by U+10), CR (U+13), or LF (U+10) as a line terminator. Lines are ignored if they are empty or if the first character is an octothorp character ('#', U+23). Other lines of the file each contain a single secret. Each secret is described using a single line composed of three values that are separated by a single space character (U+20). These values are:

label:

The label identifies the type of secret that is being conveyed; see for a description of the labels that are defined in this document.

client_random:

The 32 byte value of the Random field from the ClientHello message that established the TLS connection. This value is encoded as 64 hexadecimal characters. Including this field allows a single file to include secrets from multiple connections and for the secrets to be applied to the correct connection, though this depends on being able to match records to the correct ClientHello message.

secret:

The value of the identified secret for the identified connection. This value is encoded in hexadecimal, with a length that depends on the size of the secret.

For the hexadecimal values of the client_random or secret, no convention exists for the case of characters 'a' through 'f' (or 'A' through 'F'). Files can be generated with either, so either form MUST be accepted when processing a file. Diagnostic tools that accept files in this format might choose to ignore lines that do not conform to this format in the interest of ensuring that secrets can be obtained from corrupted files.

Secret Labels for TLS 1.3 An implementation of TLS 1.3 produces a number of values as part of the key schedule (see ). Each of the following labels correspond to the equivalent secret produced by the key schedule:

CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET:

This secret is used to protect records sent by the client as early data, if early data is attempted by the client. Note that a server that rejects early data will not log this secret, though a client that attempts early data can do so unconditionally.

EARLY_EXPORTER_MASTER_SECRET:

This secret is used for early exporters. Like the CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET, this is only generated when early data is attempted and might not be logged by a server if early data is rejected.

CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET:

This secret is used to protect handshake records sent by the client.

SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET:

This secret is used to protect handshake records sent by the server.

CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0:

This secret is used to protect application_data records sent by the client immediately after the handshake completes. This secret is identified as client_application_traffic_secret_0 in the TLS 1.3 key schedule.

SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0:

This secret is used to protect application_data records sent by the server immediately after the handshake completes. This secret is identified as server_application_traffic_secret_0 in the TLS 1.3 key schedule.

EXPORTER_SECRET:

This secret is used in generating exporters .

Each of the preceding labels are identified using the lowercase form of the label in , except as noted. Note that the order that labels appear here corresponds to the order in which they are presented in , but there is no guarantee that implementations will log secrets strictly in this order. Key updates () result in new secrets being generated for protecting application_data records. The label used for these secrets comprises a base label of "CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_" for a client or "SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_" for a server, plus the decimal value of a counter. This counter identifies the number of key updates that occurred to produce this secret. This counter starts at 0, which produces the first application data traffic secret, as above.

Secret Labels for TLS 1.2 An implementation of TLS 1.2 (and also earlier versions) use the label "CLIENT_RANDOM" to identify the "master" secret for the connection.

Security Considerations Access to the content of a file in SSLKEYLOGFILE format allows an attacker to break the confidentiality protection on any TLS connections that are included in the file. This includes both active connections and connections for which encrypted records were previously stored. Ensuring adequate access control on these files therefore becomes very important. Implementations that support logging this data need to ensure that logging can only be enabled by those who are authorized. Allowing logging to be initiated by any entity that is not otherwise authorized to observe or modify the content of connections for which secrets are logged could represent a privilege escalation attack. Implementations that enable logging also need to ensure that access to logged secrets is limited, using appropriate file permissions or equivalent access control mechanisms. In order to support decryption, the secrets necessary to remove record protection are logged. However, as the keys that can be derived from these secrets are symmetric, an adversary with access to these secrets is also able to encrypt data for an active connection. This might allow for injection or modification of application data on a connection that would otherwise be protected by TLS. As some protocols that depend on TLS generate encryption keys, the SSLKEYLOGFILE format includes keys that identify the secret used in TLS exporters or early exporters (. Knowledge of these secrets can enable more than inspection or modification of encrypted data, depending on how an application protocol uses exporters. For instance, exporters might be used for session bindings (e.g., ), authentication (e.g., ), or other derived secrets that are used in application context. An adversary that obtains these secrets might be able to use this information to attack these applications. A TLS implementation might either choose to omit these secrets in contexts where the information might be abused or to require separate authorization to enable logging of exporter secrets. Logging the TLS 1.2 "master" secret provides the recipient of a file in SSLKEYLOGFILE far greater access to an active connection. This can include the ability to resume the connection and impersonate either endpoint, insert records that result in renegotiation, or even forge Finished messages. Implementations might avoid these risks by not logging this secret value.

IANA Considerations The "application/sslkeylogfile" media type can be used to describe content in the SSLKEYLOGFILE format. IANA [has added/is requested to add] the following information to the "Media Types" registry at https://www.iana.org/assignments/media-types:

Type name:

application

Subtype name:

sslkeylogfile

Required parameters:

N/A

Optional parameters:

N/A

Encoding considerations:

8bit (Unicode without BOM or ASCII only)

Security considerations:

See .

Interoperability considerations:

Line endings might differ from platform convention

Published specification:

This document

Applications that use this media type:

Diagnostic and analysis tools that need to decrypt data that is otherwise protected by TLS.

Fragment identifier considerations:

N/A

Additional information:

Deprecated alias names for this type:

N/A

Magic number(s):

N/A

File extension(s):

N/A

Macintosh file type code(s):

N/A

Person & email address to contact for further information:

See the Authors' Addresses section.

Intended usage:

COMMON

Restrictions on usage:

N/A

Author:

See the Authors' Addresses section.

Change controller:

IESG

References Normative References This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery. This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations. This document specifies Version 1.2 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. The TLS protocol provides communications security over the Internet. The protocol allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. [STANDARDS-TRACK] In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. ISO/IEC 10646-1 defines a large character set called the Universal Character Set (UCS) which encompasses most of the world's writing systems. The originally proposed encodings of the UCS, however, were not compatible with many current applications and protocols, and this has led to the development of UTF-8, the object of this memo. UTF-8 has the characteristic of preserving the full US-ASCII range, providing compatibility with file systems, parsers and other software that rely on US-ASCII values but are transparent to other values. This memo obsoletes and replaces RFC 2279. Informative References This document formally deprecates Transport Layer Security (TLS) versions 1.0 (RFC 2246) and 1.1 (RFC 4346). Accordingly, those documents have been moved to Historic status. These versions lack support for current and recommended cryptographic algorithms and mechanisms, and various government and industry profiles of applications using TLS now mandate avoiding these old TLS versions. TLS version 1.2 became the recommended version for IETF protocols in 2008 (subsequently being obsoleted by TLS version 1.3 in 2018), providing sufficient time to transition away from older versions. Removing support for older versions from implementations reduces the attack surface, reduces opportunity for misconfiguration, and streamlines library and product maintenance. This document also deprecates Datagram TLS (DTLS) version 1.0 (RFC 4347) but not DTLS version 1.2, and there is no DTLS version 1.1. This document updates many RFCs that normatively refer to TLS version 1.0 or TLS version 1.1, as described herein. This document also updates the best practices for TLS usage in RFC 7525; hence, it is part of BCP 195. This document specifies version 1.3 of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. DTLS 1.3 allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery. The DTLS 1.3 protocol is based on the Transport Layer Security (TLS) 1.3 protocol and provides equivalent security guarantees with the exception of order protection / non-replayability. Datagram semantics of the underlying transport are preserved by the DTLS protocol. This document obsoletes RFC 6347. This document defines the core of the QUIC transport protocol. QUIC provides applications with flow-controlled streams for structured communication, low-latency connection establishment, and network path migration. QUIC includes security measures that ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability in a range of deployment circumstances. Accompanying documents describe the integration of TLS for key negotiation, loss detection, and an exemplary congestion control algorithm. This document describes how Transport Layer Security (TLS) is used to secure QUIC. Akamai Meta Protocol Labs Cloudflare This document defines qlog, an extensible high-level schema for a standardized logging format. It allows easy sharing of data, benefitting common debug and analysis methods and tooling. The high- level schema is independent of protocol; separate documents extend qlog for protocol-specific data. The schema is also independent of serialization format, allowing logs to be represented in many ways such as JSON, CSV, or protobuf. Note to Readers Note to RFC editor: Please remove this section before publication. Feedback and discussion are welcome at https://github.com/quicwg/qlog (https://github.com/quicwg/qlog). Readers are advised to refer to the "editor's draft" at that URL for an up-to-date version of this document. Concrete examples of integrations of this schema in various programming languages can be found at https://github.com/quiclog/ qlog/ (https://github.com/quiclog/qlog/). This document specifies version 1.0 of the Token Binding protocol. The Token Binding protocol allows client/server applications to create long-lived, uniquely identifiable TLS bindings spanning multiple TLS sessions and connections. Applications are then enabled to cryptographically bind security tokens to the TLS layer, preventing token export and replay attacks. To protect privacy, the Token Binding identifiers are only conveyed over TLS and can be reset by the user at any time. This document describes a mechanism that builds on Transport Layer Security (TLS) or Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) and enables peers to provide proof of ownership of an identity, such as an X.509 certificate. This proof can be exported by one peer, transmitted out of band to the other peer, and verified by the receiving peer.

Acknowledgments The SSLKEYLOGFILE format originated in the NSS project, but it has evolved over time as TLS has changed. Many people contributed to this evolution. The author is only documenting the format as it is used.