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Applications and Real-Time HTTP Digest This document defines HTTP fields that support integrity digests. The Content-Digest field can be used for the integrity of HTTP message content. The Repr-Digest field can be used for the integrity of HTTP representations. Want-Content-Digest and Want-Repr-Digest can be used to indicate a sender's interest and preferences for receiving the respective Integrity fields. This document obsoletes RFC 3230 and the Digest and Want-Digest HTTP fields. About This Document Status information for this document may be found at . Discussion of this document takes place on the HTTP Working Group mailing list (), which is archived at . Working Group information can be found at . Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at .

Introduction HTTP does not define the means to protect the data integrity of content or representations. When HTTP messages are transferred between endpoints, lower layer features or properties such as TCP checksums or TLS records can provide some integrity protection. However, transport-oriented integrity provides a limited utility because it is opaque to the application layer and only covers the extent of a single connection. HTTP messages often travel over a chain of separate connections, in between connections there is a possibility for unintended or malicious data corruption. An HTTP integrity mechanism can provide the means for endpoints, or applications using HTTP, to detect data corruption and make a choice about how to act on it. An example use case is to aid fault detection and diagnosis across system boundaries. This document defines two digest integrity mechanisms for HTTP. First, content integrity, which acts on conveyed content (). Second, representation data integrity, which acts on representation data (). This supports advanced use cases such as validating the integrity of a resource that was reconstructed from parts retrieved using multiple requests or connections. This document obsoletes RFC 3230 and therefore the Digest and Want-Digest HTTP fields; see .

Document Structure This document is structured as follows:

• New request and response header and trailer field definitions.
  • (Content-Digest),
  • (Repr-Digest), and
  • (Want-Content-Digest and Want-Repr-Digest).
• Considerations specific to representation data integrity.
  • (State-changing requests),
  • (Content-Location),
  • contains worked examples of Representation data in message exchanges, and
  • and contain worked examples of Repr-Digest and Want-Repr-Digest fields in message exchanges.
• presents hash algorithm considerations and defines registration procedures for future entries.

Concept Overview The HTTP fields defined in this document can be used for HTTP integrity. Senders choose a hashing algorithm and calculate a digest from an input related to the HTTP message, the algorithm identifier and digest are transmitted in an HTTP field. Receivers can validate the digest for integrity purposes. Hashing algorithms are registered in the "Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Fields" (see ). Selecting the data on which digests are calculated depends on the use case of HTTP messages. This document provides different fields for HTTP representation data and HTTP content. There are use-cases where a simple digest of the HTTP content bytes is required. The Content-Digest request and response header and trailer field is defined to support digests of content (); see . For more advanced use-cases, the Repr-Digest request and response header and trailer field () is defined. It contains a digest value computed by applying a hashing algorithm to selected representation data (). Basing Repr-Digest on the selected representation makes it straightforward to apply it to use-cases where the message content requires some sort of manipulation to be considered as representation of the resource or content conveys a partial representation of a resource, such as Range Requests (see ). Content-Digest and Repr-Digest support hashing algorithm agility. The Want-Content-Digest and Want-Repr-Digest fields allow endpoints to express interest in Content-Digest and Repr-Digest respectively, and to express algorithm preferences in either. Content-Digest and Repr-Digest are collectively termed Integrity fields. Want-Content-Digest and Want-Repr-Digest are collectively termed Integrity preference fields. Integrity fields are tied to the Content-Encoding and Content-Type header fields. Therefore, a given resource may have multiple different digest values when transferred with HTTP. Integrity fields do not provide integrity for HTTP messages or fields. However, they can be combined with other mechanisms that protect metadata, such as digital signatures, in order to protect the phases of an HTTP exchange in whole or in part. For example, HTTP Message Signatures could be used to sign Integrity fields, thus providing coverage for HTTP content or representation data. This specification does not define means for authentication, authorization or privacy.

Obsoleting RFC 3230 defined the Digest and Want-Digest HTTP fields for HTTP integrity. It also coined the term "instance" and "instance manipulation" in order to explain concepts that are now more universally defined, and implemented, as HTTP semantics such as selected representation data (). Experience has shown that implementations of have interpreted the meaning of "instance" inconsistently, leading to interoperability issues. The most common issue relates to the mistake of calculating the digest using (what we now call) message content, rather than using (what we now call) representation data as was originally intended. Interestingly, time has also shown that a digest of message content can be beneficial for some use cases. So it is difficult to detect if non-conformance to is intentional or unintentional. In order to address potential inconsistencies and ambiguity across implementations of Digest and Want-Digest, this document obsoletes . The Integrity fields (Sections and ) and Integrity preference fields () defined in this document are better aligned with current HTTP semantics and have names that more clearly articulate the intended usages.

Notational Conventions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. This document uses the Augmented BNF defined in and updated by . This includes the rules: CR (carriage return), LF (line feed), and CRLF (CR LF). This document uses the following terminology from to specify syntax and parsing: Boolean, Byte Sequence, Dictionary, Integer, and List. The definitions "representation", "selected representation", "representation data", "representation metadata", "user agent" and "content" in this document are to be interpreted as described in . This document uses the line folding strategies described in . Hashing algorithm names respect the casing used in their definition document (e.g. SHA-1, CRC32c) whereas hashing algorithm keys are quoted (e.g. "sha", "crc32c"). The term "checksum" describes the output of the application of an algorithm to a sequence of bytes, whereas "digest" is only used in relation to the value contained in the fields. Integrity fields: collective term for Content-Digest and Repr-Digest Integrity preference fields: collective term for Want-Repr-Digest and Want-Content-Digest

The Content-Digest Field The Content-Digest HTTP field can be used in requests and responses to communicate digests that are calculated using a hashing algorithm applied to the actual message content (see ). It is a Dictionary (see ) where each:

• key conveys the hashing algorithm (see ) used to compute the digest;
• value is a Byte Sequence (), that conveys an encoded version of the byte output produced by the digest calculation.

For example: The Dictionary type can be used, for example, to attach multiple digests calculated using different hashing algorithms in order to support a population of endpoints with different or evolving capabilities. Such an approach could support transitions away from weaker algorithms (see ). A recipient MAY ignore any or all digests. This allows the recipient to choose which hashing algorithm(s) to use for validation instead of verifying every digest. A sender MAY send a digest without knowing whether the recipient supports a given hashing algorithm, or even knowing that the recipient will ignore it. Content-Digest can be sent in a trailer section. In this case, Content-Digest MAY be merged into the header section; see .

The Repr-Digest Field The Repr-Digest HTTP field can be used in requests and responses to communicate digests that are calculated using a hashing algorithm applied to the entire selected representation data (see ). Representations take into account the effect of the HTTP semantics on messages. For example, the content can be affected by Range Requests or methods such as HEAD, while the way the content is transferred "on the wire" is dependent on other transformations (e.g. transfer codings for HTTP/1.1 - see ). To help illustrate HTTP representation concepts, several examples are provided in . When a message has no representation data it is still possible to assert that no representation data was sent by computing the digest on an empty string (see ). Repr-Digest is a Dictionary (see ) where each:

• key conveys the hashing algorithm (see ) used to compute the digest;
• value is a Byte Sequence, that conveys an encoded version of the byte output produced by the digest calculation.

For example: The Dictionary type can be used, for example, to attach multiple digests calculated using different hashing algorithms in order to support a population of endpoints with different or evolving capabilities. Such an approach could support transitions away from weaker algorithms (see ). A recipient MAY ignore any or all digests. This allows the recipient to choose which hashing algorithm(s) to use for validation instead of verifying every digest. A sender MAY send a digest without knowing whether the recipient supports a given hashing algorithm, or even knowing that the recipient will ignore it. Repr-Digest can be sent in a trailer section. In this case, Repr-Digest MAY be merged into the header section; see .

Using Repr-Digest in State-Changing Requests When the representation enclosed in a state-changing request does not describe the target resource, the representation digest MUST be computed on the representation data. This is the only possible choice because representation digest requires complete representation metadata (see ). In responses,

• if the representation describes the status of the request, Repr-Digest MUST be computed on the enclosed representation (see );
• if there is a referenced resource Repr-Digest MUST be computed on the selected representation of the referenced resource even if that is different from the target resource. That might or might not result in computing Repr-Digest on the enclosed representation.

The latter case is done according to the HTTP semantics of the given method, for example using the Content-Location header field (see ). In contrast, the Location header field does not affect Repr-Digest because it is not representation metadata. For example, in PATCH requests, the representation digest will be computed on the patch document because the representation metadata refers to the patch document and not to the target resource (see ). In responses, instead, the representation digest will be computed on the selected representation of the patched resource.

Repr-Digest and Content-Location in Responses When a state-changing method returns the Content-Location header field, the enclosed representation refers to the resource identified by its value and Repr-Digest is computed accordingly. An example is given in .

Integrity preference fields Senders can indicate their interest in Integrity fields and hashing algorithm preferences using the Want-Content-Digest or Want-Repr-Digest fields. These can be used in both requests and responses. Want-Content-Digest indicates that the sender would like to receive a content digest on messages associated with the request URI and representation metadata, using the Content-Digest field. Want-Repr-Digest indicates that the sender would like to receive a representation digest on messages associated with the request URI and representation metadata, using the Repr-Digest field. If Want-Content-Digest or Want-Repr-Digest are used in a response, it indicates that the server would like the client to provide the respective Integrity field on future requests. Integrity preference fields are only a hint. The receiver of the field can ignore it and send an Integrity field using any algorithm or omit the field entirely, for example see . It is not a protocol error if preferences are ignored. Applications that use Integrity fields and Integrity preferences can define expectations or constraints that operate in addition to this specification. How to deal with an ignored preferences is a scenario that should be considered. Want-Content-Digest and Want-Repr-Digest are of type Dictionary where each:

• key conveys the hashing algorithm (see );
• value is an Integer () that conveys an ascending, relative, weighted preference. It must be in the range 0 to 10 inclusive. 1 is the least preferred, 10 is the most preferred, and a value of 0 means "not acceptable".

Examples:

Hash Algorithm Considerations and Registration There are a wide variety of hashing algorithms that can be used for the purposes of integrity. The choice of algorithm depends on several factors such as the integrity use case, implementation needs or constraints, or application design and workflows. An initial set of algorithms will be registered with IANA in the "Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Fields" registry; see . Additional algorithms can be registered in accordance with the policies set out in this section. Each algorithm has a status field, which is intended to provide an aid to implementation selection. Algorithms with a status value of "standard" are suitable for many purposes, including adversarial situations where hash functions might need to provide resistance to collision, first-preimage and second-preimage attacks. For adversarial situations, selecting which of the "standard" algorithms are acceptable will depend on the level of protection the circumstances demand. As there is no negotiation, endpoints that depend on a digest for security will be vulnerable to attacks on the weakest algorithm they are willing to accept. Algorithms with a status value of "insecure" either provide none of these properties, or are known to be weak (see and ). These algorithms MAY be used to preserve integrity against corruption, but MUST NOT be used in a potentially adversarial setting; for example, when signing Integrity fields' values for authenticity. Discussion of algorithm agility is presented in . Registration requests for the "Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Fields" registry use the Specification Required policy (). Requests should use the following template:

• Algorithm Key: the Structured Fields key value used in Content-Digest, Repr-Digest, Want-Content-Digest, or Want-Repr-Digest field Dictionary member keys
• Status: the status of the algorithm. The options are:
  • "standard" - for standardized algorithms without known problems,
  • "provisional" - for non-standard or unproven algorithms,
  • "insecure" - for insecure algorithms,
  • "reserved" - for algorithms that use a reserved token value that cannot be expressed in Structured Fields
• Description: a short description of the algorithm
• Reference(s): pointer(s) to the primary document(s) defining the technical details of the algorithm, and optionally the key

When reviewing registration requests, the designated expert(s) should pay attention to the requested status. The status value should reflect standardization status and the broad opinion of relevant interest groups such as the IETF or security-related SDOs. The "standard" status is not suitable for an algorithm that is known to be weak, broken or experimental. If a registration request attempts to register such an algorithm as "standard", the designated expert(s) should suggest an alternative status of "insecure" or "provisional". When reviewing registration requests, the designated expert(s) cannot use a status of "insecure" or "provisional" as grounds for rejection. Requests to update or change the fields in an existing registration are permitted. For example, this could allow for the transition of an algorithm status from "standard" to "insecure" as the security environment evolves.

Security Considerations

HTTP Messages Are Not Protected In Full This document specifies a data integrity mechanism that protects HTTP representation data or content, but not HTTP header and trailer fields, from certain kinds of corruption. Integrity fields are not intended to be a general protection against malicious tampering with HTTP messages. This can be achieved by combining it with other approaches such as transport-layer security or digital signatures (for example, HTTP Message Signatures ).

End-to-End Integrity Integrity fields can help detect representation data or content modification due to implementation errors, undesired "transforming proxies" (see ) or other actions as the data passes across multiple hops or system boundaries. Even a simple mechanism for end-to-end representation data integrity is valuable because a user agent can validate that resource retrieval succeeded before handing off to a HTML parser, video player etc. for parsing. Note that using these mechanisms alone does not provide end-to-end integrity of HTTP messages over multiple hops, since metadata could be manipulated at any stage. Methods to protect metadata are discussed in .

Usage in Signatures Digital signatures are widely used together with checksums to provide the certain identification of the origin of a message . Such signatures can protect one or more HTTP fields and there are additional considerations when Integrity fields are included in this set. There are no restrictions placed on the type or format of digitial signature that Integrity fields can be used with. One possible approach is to combine them with HTTP Message Signatures . Digests explicitly depend on the "representation metadata" (e.g. the values of Content-Type, Content-Encoding etc). A signature that protects Integrity fields but not other "representation metadata" can expose the communication to tampering. For example, an actor could manipulate the Content-Type field-value and cause a digest validation failure at the recipient, preventing the application from accessing the representation. Such an attack consumes the resources of both endpoints. See also . Signatures are likely to be deemed an adversarial setting when applying Integrity fields; see . Using signatures to protect the checksum of an empty representation allows receiving endpoints to detect if an eventual payload has been stripped or added. Any mangling of Integrity fields, including digests' de-duplication or combining different field values (see ) might affect signature validation.

Usage in Trailer Fields Before sending Integrity fields in a trailer section, the sender should consider that intermediaries are explicitly allowed to drop any trailer (see ). When Integrity fields are used in a trailer section, the field-values are received after the content. Eager processing of content before the trailer section prevents digest validation, possibly leading to processing of invalid data. Not every hashing algorithm is suitable for use in the trailer section, some may require to pre-process the whole payload before sending a message (e.g. see ).

Variations Within Content Encoding Content coding mechanisms can support different encoding parameters, meaning that the same input content can produce different outputs. For example, GZIP supports mulitple compression levels. Such encoding parameters are generally not communicated as representation metadata, for instance different compression levels would all use the same "Content-Encoding: gzip" field. Other examples include where encoding relies on nonces or timestamps, such as the aes128gcm content coding defined . Since it is possible for there to be variation within content coding, the checksum conveyed by the integrity field cannot be used to provide a proof of integrity "at rest" unless the whole (e.g. encoded) content is persisted.

Algorithm Agility The security properties of hashing algorithms are not fixed. Algorithm Agility (see ) is achieved by providing implementations with flexibility to choose hashing algorithms from the IANA Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Fields registry; see . Transition from weak algorithms is supported by negotiation of hashing algorithm using Want-Content-Digest or Want-Repr-Digest (see ) or by sending multiple digests from which the receiver chooses. Endpoints are advised that sending multiple values consumes resources, which may be wasted if the receiver ignores them (see ). While algorithm agility allows the migration to stronger algorithms it does not prevent the use of weaker algorithms. Integrity fields do not provide any mitigations for downgrade or substitution attacks (see Section 1 of ) of the hashing algorithm. To protect against such attacks, endpoints could restrict their set of supported algorithms to stronger ones and protect the fields value by using TLS and/or digital signatures.

Resource exhaustion Integrity fields validation consumes computational resources. In order to avoid resource exhaustion, implementations can restrict validation of the algorithm types, number of validations, or the size of content.

IANA Considerations

HTTP Field Name Registration IANA is asked to update the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Field Name Registry" registry () according to the table below:

Field Name	Status	Reference
Content-Digest	permanent	of this document
Repr-Digest	permanent	of this document
Want-Content-Digest	permanent	of this document
Want-Repr-Digest	permanent	of this document
Digest	obsoleted	, of this document
Want-Digest	obsoleted	, of this document

Establish the Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Fields Registry IANA is requested to create the new "Hash Algorithms for HTTP Digest Fields" registry at https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-digest-hash-alg/ and populate it with the entries in . The procedure for new registrations is provided in . Initial Hash Algorithms

Algorithm Key	Status	Description	Reference(s)
sha-512	standard	The SHA-512 algorithm.	, , this document.
sha-256	standard	The SHA-256 algorithm.	, , this document.
md5	insecure	The MD5 algorithm. It is vulnerable to collision attacks; see and	, , this document.
sha	insecure	The SHA-1 algorithm. It is vulnerable to collision attacks; see and	, , this document.
unixsum	insecure	The algorithm used by the UNIX "sum" command.	, , , this document.
unixcksum	insecure	The algorithm used by the UNIX "cksum" command.	, , , this document.
adler	insecure	The ADLER32 algorithm.	, this document.
crc32c	insecure	The CRC32c algorithm.	appendix B, this document.

Deprecate the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Digest Algorithm Values Registry IANA is requested to deprecate the "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Digest Algorithm Values" registry at https://www.iana.org/assignments/http-dig-alg/http-dig-alg.xhtml.

References Normative References This document describes the MD5 message-digest algorithm. The algorithm takes as input a message of arbitrary length and produces as output a 128-bit "fingerprint" or "message digest" of the input. This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard. The purpose of this document is to make the SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm 1) hash algorithm conveniently available to the Internet community. This memo provides information for the Internet community. This specification defines a lossless compressed data format. This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. This document describes the commonly used base 64, base 32, and base 16 encoding schemes. It also discusses the use of line-feeds in encoded data, use of padding in encoded data, use of non-alphabet characters in encoded data, use of different encoding alphabets, and canonical encodings. [STANDARDS-TRACK] Internet technical specifications often need to define a formal syntax. Over the years, a modified version of Backus-Naur Form (BNF), called Augmented BNF (ABNF), has been popular among many Internet specifications. The current specification documents ABNF. It balances compactness and simplicity with reasonable representational power. The differences between standard BNF and ABNF involve naming rules, repetition, alternatives, order-independence, and value ranges. This specification also supplies additional rule definitions and encoding for a core lexical analyzer of the type common to several Internet specifications. [STANDARDS-TRACK] Federal Information Processing Standard, FIPS This document extends the base definition of ABNF (Augmented Backus-Naur Form) to include a way to specify US-ASCII string literals that are matched in a case-sensitive manner. This document defines two strategies for handling long lines in width-bounded text content. One strategy, called the "single backslash" strategy, is based on the historical use of a single backslash ('\') character to indicate where line-folding has occurred, with the continuation occurring with the first character that is not a space character (' ') on the next line. The second strategy, called the "double backslash" strategy, extends the first strategy by adding a second backslash character to identify where the continuation begins and is thereby able to handle cases not supported by the first strategy. Both strategies use a self-describing header enabling automated reconstitution of the original content. The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. This document describes the overall architecture of HTTP, establishes common terminology, and defines aspects of the protocol that are shared by all versions. In this definition are core protocol elements, extensibility mechanisms, and the "http" and "https" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes. This document updates RFC 3864 and obsoletes RFCs 2818, 7231, 7232, 7233, 7235, 7538, 7615, 7694, and portions of 7230. In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. This document describes a set of data types and associated algorithms that are intended to make it easier and safer to define and handle HTTP header and trailer fields, known as "Structured Fields", "Structured Headers", or "Structured Trailers". It is intended for use by specifications of new HTTP fields that wish to use a common syntax that is more restrictive than traditional HTTP field values. Many protocols make use of points of extensibility that use constants to identify various protocol parameters. To ensure that the values in these fields do not have conflicting uses and to promote interoperability, their allocations are often coordinated by a central record keeper. For IETF protocols, that role is filled by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA). To make assignments in a given registry prudently, guidance describing the conditions under which new values should be assigned, as well as when and how modifications to existing values can be made, is needed. This document defines a framework for the documentation of these guidelines by specification authors, in order to assure that the provided guidance for the IANA Considerations is clear and addresses the various issues that are likely in the operation of a registry. This is the third edition of this document; it obsoletes RFC 5226. Informative References HTTP/1.1 defines a Content-MD5 header that allows a server to include a digest of the response body. However, this is specifically defined to cover the body of the actual message, not the contents of the full file (which might be quite different, if the response is a Content-Range, or uses a delta encoding). Also, the Content-MD5 is limited to one specific digest algorithm; other algorithms, such as SHA-1 (Secure Hash Standard), may be more appropriate in some circumstances. Finally, HTTP/1.1 provides no explicit mechanism by which a client may request a digest. This document proposes HTTP extensions that solve these problems. [STANDARDS-TRACK] The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. This document specifies the HTTP/1.1 message syntax, message parsing, connection management, and related security concerns. This document obsoletes portions of RFC 7230. Several applications extending the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) require a feature to do partial resource modification. The existing HTTP PUT method only allows a complete replacement of a document. This proposal adds a new HTTP method, PATCH, to modify an existing HTTP resource. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document updates the security considerations for the MD5 message digest algorithm. It also updates the security considerations for HMAC-MD5. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes. This document includes security considerations for the SHA-0 and SHA-1 message digest algorithm. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes. Amazon Bespoke Engineering Digital Bazaar This document describes a mechanism for creating, encoding, and verifying digital signatures or message authentication codes over components of an HTTP message. This mechanism supports use cases where the full HTTP message may not be known to the signer, and where the message may be transformed (e.g., by intermediaries) before reaching the verifier. This document also describes a means for requesting that a signature be applied to a subsequent HTTP message in an ongoing HTTP exchange. The Open Group National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce Carnegie Mellon University, Software Engineering Institute Inria, France Nanyang Technological University, Singapore; Temasek Laboratories, Singapore This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, and message forgery. This document updates RFCs 5705 and 6066, and obsoletes RFCs 5077, 5246, and 6961. This document also specifies new requirements for TLS 1.2 implementations. Mozilla Google This memo introduces a content-coding for HTTP that provides progressive integrity for message contents. This integrity protection can be evaluated on a partial representation, allowing a recipient to process a message as it is delivered while retaining strong integrity protection. This memo introduces a content coding for HTTP that allows message payloads to be encrypted. Many IETF protocols use cryptographic algorithms to provide confidentiality, integrity, authentication, or digital signature. Communicating peers must support a common set of cryptographic algorithms for these mechanisms to work properly. This memo provides guidelines to ensure that protocols have the ability to migrate from one mandatory-to-implement algorithm suite to another over time. The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS), unlike X.509/PKIX certificates, is vulnerable to algorithm substitution attacks. In an algorithm substitution attack, the attacker changes either the algorithm being used or the parameters of the algorithm in order to change the result of a signature verification process. In X.509 certificates, the signature algorithm is protected because it is duplicated in the TBSCertificate.signature field with the proviso that the validator is to compare both fields as part of the signature validation process. This document defines a new attribute that contains a copy of the relevant algorithm identifiers so that they are protected by the signature or authentication process. [STANDARDS-TRACK] This document describes the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) and obsoletes RFC 4960. It incorporates the specification of the chunk flags registry from RFC 6096 and the specification of the I bit of DATA chunks from RFC 7053. Therefore, RFCs 6096 and 7053 are also obsoleted by this document. In addition, RFCs 4460 and 8540, which describe errata for SCTP, are obsoleted by this document. SCTP was originally designed to transport Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) signaling messages over IP networks. It is also suited to be used for other applications, for example, WebRTC. SCTP is a reliable transport protocol operating on top of a connectionless packet network, such as IP. It offers the following services to its users: The design of SCTP includes appropriate congestion avoidance behavior and resistance to flooding and masquerade attacks. This specification defines the JSON merge patch format and processing rules. The merge patch format is primarily intended for use with the HTTP PATCH method as a means of describing a set of modifications to a target resource's content. This document defines a "problem detail" as a way to carry machine- readable details of errors in a HTTP response to avoid the need to define new error response formats for HTTP APIs.

Resource Representation and Representation Data The following examples show how representation metadata, payload transformations and method impacts on the message and content. When the content contains non-printable characters (e.g. when it is compressed) it is shown as a sequence of hex-encoded bytes.

Request containing a JSON object without any content coding

Compression is an efficient way to reduce the content length.

Request containing a gzip-encoded JSON object

Sending the compressed form of the content without the correct content coding means that the content is malformed. In this case, the server can reply with an error.

Request containing malformed JSON

An error response for a malformed content

A Range-Request affects the transferred message content, conveying a partial representation of the JSON object in .

Request for partial content

Partial response from a gzip-encoded representation

The method can also affect the transferred message content. For example, the response to a HEAD request does not carry content.

HEAD request

Response to HEAD request (empty content)

Finally, the semantics of a response might decouple the target URI from the enclosed representation. In the example response below, the Content-Location header field indicates that the enclosed representation refers to the resource available at /authors/123, even though the request is directed to /authors/.

POST request

Response with Content-Location header

Examples of Unsolicited Digest The following examples demonstrate interactions where a server responds with a Content-Digest or Repr-Digest fields even though the client did not solicit one using Want-Content-Digest or Want-Repr-Digest. Some examples include JSON objects in the content. For presentation purposes, objects that fit completely within the line-length limits are presented on a single line using compact notation with no leading space. Objects that would exceed line-length limits are presented across multiple lines (one line per key-value pair) with 2 spaced of leading indentation. Checksum mechanisms defined in this document are media-type agnostic and do not provide canonicalization algorithms for specific formats. Examples are calculated inclusive of any space. While examples can include both fields, Content-Digest and Repr-Digest can be returned independently.

Server Returns Full Representation Data In this example, the message content conveys complete representation data. This means that in the response, Content-Digest and Repr-Digest are both computed over the JSON object {"hello": "world"} followed by an LF, and thus have the same value.

GET request for an item

Response with identical Repr-Digest and Content-Digest

Server Returns No Representation Data In this example, a HEAD request is used to retrieve the checksum of a resource. The response Content-Digest field-value is computed on empty content. Repr-Digest is calculated over the JSON object {"hello": "world"} followed by an LF, which is not shown because there is no payload data.

HEAD request for an item

Response with both Content-Digest and Digest; empty content

Server Returns Partial Representation Data In this example, the client makes a range request and the server responds with partial content.

Request for partial content

Partial response with both Content-Digest and Repr-Digest

In the response message above, note that the Repr-Digest and Content-Digests are different. The Repr-Digest field-value is calculated across the entire JSON object {"hello": "world"} followed by an LF, and the field is However, since the message content is constrained to bytes 10-18, the Content-Digest field-value is calculated over the sequence "world"} followed by an LF, thus resulting in

Client and Server Provide Full Representation Data The request contains a Repr-Digest field-value calculated on the enclosed representation. It also includes an Accept-Encoding: br header field that advertises the client supports Brotli encoding. The response includes a Content-Encoding: br that indicates the selected representation is Brotli-encoded. The Repr-Digest field-value is therefore different compared to the request. For presentation purposes, the response body is displayed as a sequence of hex-encoded bytes because it contains non-printable characters.

PUT Request with Digest

Response with Digest of encoded response

Client Provides Full Representation Data, Server Provides No Representation Data The request Repr-Digest field-value is calculated on the enclosed content, which is the JSON object {"hello": "world"} followed by an LF The response Repr-Digest field-value depends on the representation metadata header fields, including Content-Encoding: br even when the response does not contain content.

Empty response with Digest

Client and Server Provide Full Representation Data The response contains two digest values using different algorithms. For presentation purposes, the response body is displayed as a sequence of hex-encoded bytes because it contains non-printable characters.

PUT Request with Digest

Response with Digest of Encoded Content

POST Response does not Reference the Request URI The request Repr-Digest field-value is computed on the enclosed representation (see ), which is the JSON object {"title": "New Title"} followed by an LF. The representation enclosed in the response is a multiline JSON object followed by an LF. It refers to the resource identified by Content-Location (see ); an application can thus use Repr-Digest in association with the resource referenced by Content-Location.

POST Request with Digest

Response with Digest of Resource

POST Response Describes the Request Status The request Repr-Digest field-value is computed on the enclosed representation (see ), which is the JSON object {"title": "New Title"} followed by an LF. The representation enclosed in the response describes the status of the request, so Repr-Digest is computed on that enclosed representation. It is a multiline JSON object followed by an LF. Response Repr-Digest has no explicit relation with the resource referenced by Location.

POST Request with Digest

Response with Digest of Representation

Digest with PATCH This case is analogous to a POST request where the target resource reflects the target URI. The PATCH request uses the application/merge-patch+json media type defined in . Repr-Digest is calculated on the enclosed payload, which corresponds to the patch document and is the JSON object {"title": "New Title"} followed by an LF. The response Repr-Digest field-value is computed on the complete representation of the patched resource. It is a multiline JSON object followed by an LF.

PATCH Request with Digest

Response with Digest of Representation

Note that a 204 No Content response without content but with the same Repr-Digest field-value would have been legitimate too. In that case, Content-Digest would have been computed on an empty content.

Error responses In error responses, the representation data does not necessarily refer to the target resource. Instead, it refers to the representation of the error. In the following example, a client sends the same request from to patch the resource located at /books/123. However, the resource does not exist and the server generates a 404 response with a body that describes the error in accordance with . The response Repr-Digest field-value is computed on this enclosed representation. It is a multiline JSON object followed by an LF.

Response with Digest of Error Representation

Use with Trailer Fields and Transfer Coding An origin server sends Repr-Digest as trailer field, so it can calculate digest-value while streaming content and thus mitigate resource consumption. The Repr-Digest field-value is the same as in because Repr-Digest is designed to be independent from the use of one or more transfer codings (see ). In the response content below, the string "\r\n" represent the bytes CRLF.

GET Request

Chunked Response with Digest

Examples of Want-Repr-Digest Solicited Digest The following examples demonstrate interactions where a client solicits a Repr-Digest using Want-Repr-Digest. The behavior of Content-Digest and Want-Content-Digest is identical. Some examples include JSON objects in the content. For presentation purposes, objects that fit completely within the line-length limits are presented on a single line using compact notation with no leading space. Objects that would exceed line-length limits are presented across multiple lines (one line per key-value pair) with 2 spaced of leading indentation. Checksum mechanisms described in this document are media-type agnostic and do not provide canonicalization algorithms for specific formats. Examples are calculated inclusive of any space.

Server Selects Client's Least Preferred Algorithm The client requests a digest, preferring "sha". The server is free to reply with "sha-256" anyway.

GET Request with Want-Repr-Digest

Response with Different Algorithm

Server Selects Algorithm Unsupported by Client The client requests a "sha" digest because that is the only algorithm it supports. The server is not obliged to produce a response containing a "sha" digest, it instead uses a different algorithm.

GET Request with Want-Repr-Digest

Response with Unsupported Algorithm

Server Does Not Support Client Algorithm and Returns an Error is an example where a server ignores the client's preferred digest algorithm. Alternatively a server can also reject the request and return a response with error status code such as 4xx or 5xx. This specification does not prescribe any requirement on status code selection; the follow example illustrates one possible option. In this example, the client requests a "sha" Repr-Digest, and the server returns an error with problem details contained in the content. The problem details contain a list of the hashing algorithms that the server supports. This is purely an example, this specification does not define any format or requirements for such content.

GET Request with Want-Repr-Digest

Response advertising the supported algorithms

Sample Digest Values This section shows examples of digest values for different hashing algorithms. The input value is the JSON object {"hello": "world"}. The digest values are each produced by running the relevant hashing algorithm over the input and running the output bytes through Byte Sequence serialization; see .

Migrating from RFC 3230 HTTP digests are computed by applying a hashing algorithm to input data. RFC 3230 defined the input data as an "instance", a term it also defined. The concept of instance has since been superseded by the HTTP semantic term "representation". It is understood that some implementations of RFC 3230 mistook "instance" to mean HTTP content. Using content for the Digest field is an error that leads to interoperability problems between peers that implement RFC 3230. RFC 3230 was only ever intended to use what HTTP now defines as selected representation data. The semantic concept of digest and representation are explained alongside the definition of the Repr-Digest field. While the syntax of Digest and Repr-Digest are different, the considerations and examples this document gives for Repr-Digest apply equally to Digest because they operate on the same input data; see Sections , and . RFC 3230 could never communicate the digest of HTTP message content in the Digest field; Content-Digest now provides that capability. RFC 3230 allowed algorithms to define their output encoding format for use with the Digest field. This resulted in a mixed of formats such as base64, hex or decimal. By virtue of using Structured fields, Content-Digest and Repr-Digest use only a single encoding format. Further explanation and examples are provided in .

Acknowledgements This document is based on ideas from , so thanks to Jeff Mogul and Arthur Van Hoff for their great work. The original idea of refreshing RFC3230 arose from an interesting discussion with Mark Nottingham, Jeffrey Yasskin and Martin Thomson when reviewing the MICE content coding. Thanks to Julian Reschke for his valuable contributions to this document, and to the following contributors that have helped improve this specification by reporting bugs, asking smart questions, drafting or reviewing text, and evaluating open issues: Mike Bishop, Brian Campbell, Matthew Kerwin, James Manger, Tommy Pauly, Sean Turner, Justin Richer, and Erik Wilde.

Code Samples How can I generate and validate the digest values, computed over the JSON object {"hello": "world"} followed by an LF, shown in the examples throughout this document? The following python3 code can be used to generate digests for JSON objects using SHA algorithms for a range of encodings. Note that these are formatted as base64. This function could be adapted to other algorithms and should take into account their specific formatting rules.

Changes

Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-10

• Editorial or minor changes

Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-09

• Editorial or minor changes

Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-08

• Add note about migrating from RFC 3230. #1968, #1971
• Clarify what Want-* means in responses. #2097
• Editorial changes to structure and to align to HTTP style guide.

Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-07

• Introduced Repr-Digest and Want-Repr-Digest, and deprecated Digest and Want-Digest. Use of Structured Fields. #1993, #1919
• IANA refactoring. #1983
• No normative text in security considerations. #1972

Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-06

• Remove id-sha-256 and id-sha-512 from the list of supported algorithms #855

Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-05

• Reboot digest-algorithm values registry #1567
• Add Content-Digest #1542
• Remove SRI section #1478

Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-04

• Improve SRI section #1354
• About duplicate digest-algorithms #1221
• Improve security considerations #852
• md5 and sha deprecation references #1392
• Obsolete 3230 #1395
• Editorial #1362

Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-03

• Reference semantics-12
• Detail encryption quirks
• Details on Algorithm agility #1250
• Obsolete parameters #850

Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-02

• Deprecate SHA-1 #1154
• Avoid id-* with encrypted content
• Digest is independent from MESSAGING and HTTP/1.1 is not normative #1215
• Identity is not a valid field value for content-encoding #1223
• Mention trailers #1157
• Reference httpbis-semantics #1156
• Add contentMD5 as an obsoleted digest-algorithm #1249
• Use lowercase digest-algorithms names in the doc and in the digest-algorithm IANA table.

Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-01

• Digest of error responses is computed on the error representation-data #1004
• Effect of HTTP semantics on payload and message body moved to appendix #1122
• Editorial refactoring, moving headers sections up. #1109-#1112, #1116, #1117, #1122-#1124

Since draft-ietf-httpbis-digest-headers-00

• Align title with document name
• Add id-sha-* algorithm examples #880
• Reference and instead of FIPS-1
• Deprecate MD5
• Obsolete ADLER-32 but don't forbid it #828
• Update CRC32C value in IANA table #828
• Use when acting on resources (POST, PATCH) #853
• Added Relationship with SRI, draft Use Cases #868, #971
• Warn about the implications of Content-Location