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<rfc ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-hoffman-dnssec-00" category="bcp" consensus="true" submissionType="IETF" tocDepth="4" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true">
  <front>
    <title abbrev="DNSSEC">DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC)</title>

    <author initials="P." surname="Hoffman" fullname="Paul Hoffman">
      <organization>ICANN</organization>
      <address>
        <email>paul.hoffman@icann.org</email>
      </address>
    </author>

    <date year="2022" month="March" day="19"/>

    
    
    <keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword>

    <abstract>


<t>This document describes the DNS security extensions (commonly called "DNSSEC") that are
specified RFCs 4033, 4034, 4035, and a handful of others. The purpose is to introduce
all of the RFCs in one place so that the reader can understand the many aspects of DNSSEC.
This document does not update any of those RFCs.</t>

<t>This document is currently maintained at https://github.com/paulehoffman/draft-hoffman-dnssec.
Issues and pull requests are welcomed.
If the document is later adopted by a working group, a new repository will likely
be created.</t>



    </abstract>



  </front>

  <middle>


<section anchor="introduction"><name>Introduction</name>

<t>The core specification for what we know as DNSSEC (the combination of <xref target="RFC4033"/>,
<xref target="RFC4034"/>, and <xref target="RFC4035"/>) describes a set of protocols that provides origin
authentication to data in the DNS. <xref target="RFC6840"/> updates and extends those core RFCs,
but does not fundamentally change the way that DNSSEC works.</t>

<t>This document lists many (but not all) of the RFCs that should be considered by someone
creating an implementation of, or someone deploying, modern DNSSEC.
It uses terminology from those documents without defining that terminology.
It also points to the relevant IANA registries that relate to DNSSEC.
It does not, however, point to standards that rely on zones needing to be signed by DNSSEC.</t>

<section anchor="dnssec-as-a-best-current-practice"><name>DNSSEC as a Best Current Practice</name>

<t>The DNSSEC set of protocols is widely considered the best current practice for adding
origin authentication of data in the DNS. To date, no standards-track RFCs offer any other
method for such origin authentication of data in the DNS.</t>

<t>Some observers note that, more than 15 years after the DNSSEC specification was published,
it is still not widely deployed. Recent estimates are that fewer than 10% of the domain names
used for web sites are signed, and only around a third of queries to recursive resolvers
are validated. However, this low level of implementation does not affect whether DNSSEC
is a best current practice; it just indicates that the value of deploying DNSSEC is often
considered lower than the cost.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="dnssec-core-documents"><name>DNSSEC Core Documents</name>

<t>What we today call "DNSSEC" is formally version 3 of the DNSSEC specification.
However, earlier versions of DNSSEC were thinly deployed and significantly less
visible than the current DNSSEC specification. Throughout this document, "DNSSEC"
means the version of the protocol initially defined in <xref target="RFC4033"/>, <xref target="RFC4034"/>, and <xref target="RFC4035"/>.</t>

<t>The three initial core documents generally cover different topics:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t><xref target="RFC4033"/> is an overview of DNSSEC, including how it might change the resolution of DNS queries.</t>
  <t><xref target="RFC4034"/> specifies the DNS resource records used in DNSSEC.
It obsoletes many RFCs for earlier versions of DNSSEC.</t>
  <t><xref target="RFC4035"/> covers the modifications to the DNS protocol incurred by DNSSEC.
These include signing zones, serving signed zones, resolving in light of
DNSSEC, and authenticating DNSSEC-signed data.</t>
</list></t>

<t>At the time this set of core documents was published, someone could create a DNSSEC
implementation of signing software, of an DNSSEC-aware authoritative server, and/or
a DNSSEC-aware recursive resolver from the three core documents plus a few older
RFCs specifying the cryptography used. Those two older documents are:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t><xref target="RFC2536"/> defines how to use the DSA signature algorithm (although refers to other
documents for the details).
DSA was thinly implemented and can safely be ignored by DNSSEC implementations</t>
  <t><xref target="RFC3110"/> defines how to use the RSA signature algorithm (although refers to other
documents for the details).
RSA is still the most popular signing algorithm for DNSSEC.</t>
</list></t>

<section anchor="addition-to-the-dnssec-core"><name>Addition to the DNSSEC Core</name>

<t>As with any major protocol, developers and operators discovered issues with the original
core documents over the years.
<xref target="RFC6840"/> is an omnibus update to the original core documents and thus itself has
become a core document.
In addition to covering new requirements from new DNSSEC RFCs, it describes many important
security and interoperability issues that arose during the deployment of the initial
specifications, particularly after the DNS root was signed in 2010.
It also lists some errors in the examples of the core specifications.</t>

<t><xref target="RFC6840"/> brings a few additions into the core of DNSSEC.
It makes NSEC3 <xref target="RFC5155"/> as much a part of DNSSEC as NSEC is.
It also makes the SHA-2 hash function defined in <xref target="RFC4509"/> and <xref target="RFC5702"/> part of the core as well.
# Cryptographic Algorithms and DNSSEC</t>

<t>Cryptography improves over time, and new algorithms get adopted by various Internet protocols.
Two new  signing algorithms have been adopted by the DNSSEC community: ECDSA <xref target="RFC6605"/> and EdDSA <xref target="RFC8080"/>.
The GOST signing algorithm <xref target="RFC5933"/> was also adopted, but has seen very limited use, likely
because it is a national algorithm specific to a very small number of countries.
<!-- RFC 5933 is being updated (soon?) by draft-ietf-dnsop-rfc5933-bis --></t>

<t>Implementation developers who want to know which algorithms to implement in DNSSEC software
should refer to <xref target="RFC8624"/>.
Note that this specification is only about what algorithms should and should not be included
in implementations: it is not advice for which algorithms that zone operators should and
should not sign with, nor which algorithms recursive resolver operators should or should not
validate.</t>

</section>
</section>
<section anchor="extensions-to-dnssec"><name>Extensions to DNSSEC</name>

<t>The DNSSEC community has extended the DNSSEC core and the cryptographic algorithms both
in terms of describing good operational practices and in new protocols. Some of the
RFCs that describe these extensions include:</t>

<t><list style="symbols">
  <t><xref target="RFC5011"/> explains how recursive resolvers and the DNS root can work together to automate 
the rollover of the root's key signing key (KSK).</t>
  <t><xref target="RFC6781"/> is a compendium of operational practices that may not be obvious from reading
just the core specifications.</t>
  <t><xref target="RFC7344"/> describes using the CDS and CDNSKEY resource records to help automate the creation
of DS records in the parents of signed zones.</t>
  <t><xref target="RFC8078"/> extends <xref target="RFC7344"/> by showing how to do initial setup of trusted relationships
between signed parent and child zones.</t>
  <t><xref target="RFC8198"/> describes how a validating resolver can emit fewer queries in signed zones that
use NSEC for negative caching.</t>
  <t><xref target="RFC9077"/> updates <xref target="RFC8198"/> with respect to the time-to-live (TTL) fields in signed records.</t>
</list></t>

</section>
<section anchor="iana-considerations"><name>IANA Considerations</name>

<t>IANA already has two registries that relate to DNSSEC:
DNSSEC algorithm numbers (https://www.iana.org/assignments/dns-sec-alg-numbers) and
DNSSEC NSEC3 parameters (https://www.iana.org/assignments/dnssec-nsec3-parameters).
The rules for the DNSSEC algorithm registry were set in the core RFCs and
updated by <xref target="RFC6014"/> and <xref target="RFC9157"/>.</t>

<t>This document does not create any new IANA considerations.</t>

</section>
<section anchor="security-considerations"><name>Security Considerations</name>

<t>All of the security considerations from all of the RFCs referenced in this document
apply here.</t>

</section>


  </middle>

  <back>


    <references title='Normative References'>





<reference anchor='RFC3110' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3110'>
<front>
<title>RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain Name System (DNS)</title>
<author fullname='D. Eastlake 3rd' initials='D.' surname='Eastlake 3rd'><organization/></author>
<date month='May' year='2001'/>
<abstract><t>This document describes how to produce RSA/SHA1 SIG resource records (RRs) in Section 3 and, so as to completely replace RFC 2537, describes how to produce RSA KEY RRs in Section 2.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='3110'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC3110'/>
</reference>



<reference anchor='RFC4033' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033'>
<front>
<title>DNS Security Introduction and Requirements</title>
<author fullname='R. Arends' initials='R.' surname='Arends'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='R. Austein' initials='R.' surname='Austein'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='M. Larson' initials='M.' surname='Larson'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='D. Massey' initials='D.' surname='Massey'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='S. Rose' initials='S.' surname='Rose'><organization/></author>
<date month='March' year='2005'/>
<abstract><t>The Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) add data origin authentication and data integrity to the Domain Name System.  This document introduces these extensions and describes their capabilities and limitations.  This document also discusses the services that the DNS security extensions do and do not provide.  Last, this document describes the interrelationships between the documents that collectively describe DNSSEC.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='4033'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC4033'/>
</reference>



<reference anchor='RFC4034' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034'>
<front>
<title>Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions</title>
<author fullname='R. Arends' initials='R.' surname='Arends'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='R. Austein' initials='R.' surname='Austein'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='M. Larson' initials='M.' surname='Larson'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='D. Massey' initials='D.' surname='Massey'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='S. Rose' initials='S.' surname='Rose'><organization/></author>
<date month='March' year='2005'/>
<abstract><t>This document is part of a family of documents that describe the DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC).  The DNS Security Extensions are a collection of resource records and protocol modifications that provide source authentication for the DNS.  This document defines the public key (DNSKEY), delegation signer (DS), resource record digital signature (RRSIG), and authenticated denial of existence (NSEC) resource records.  The purpose and format of each resource record is described in detail, and an example of each resource record is given. </t><t> This document obsoletes RFC 2535 and incorporates changes from all updates to RFC 2535.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='4034'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC4034'/>
</reference>



<reference anchor='RFC4035' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4035'>
<front>
<title>Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions</title>
<author fullname='R. Arends' initials='R.' surname='Arends'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='R. Austein' initials='R.' surname='Austein'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='M. Larson' initials='M.' surname='Larson'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='D. Massey' initials='D.' surname='Massey'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='S. Rose' initials='S.' surname='Rose'><organization/></author>
<date month='March' year='2005'/>
<abstract><t>This document is part of a family of documents that describe the DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC).  The DNS Security Extensions are a collection of new resource records and protocol modifications that add data origin authentication and data integrity to the DNS.  This document describes the DNSSEC protocol modifications.  This document defines the concept of a signed zone, along with the requirements for serving and resolving by using DNSSEC.  These techniques allow a security-aware resolver to authenticate both DNS resource records and authoritative DNS error indications. </t><t> This document obsoletes RFC 2535 and incorporates changes from all updates to RFC 2535.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='4035'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC4035'/>
</reference>



<reference anchor='RFC4509' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4509'>
<front>
<title>Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Records (RRs)</title>
<author fullname='W. Hardaker' initials='W.' surname='Hardaker'><organization/></author>
<date month='May' year='2006'/>
<abstract><t>This document specifies how to use the SHA-256 digest type in DNS Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Records (RRs).  DS records, when stored in a parent zone, point to DNSKEYs in a child zone.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='4509'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC4509'/>
</reference>



<reference anchor='RFC5155' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5155'>
<front>
<title>DNS Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of Existence</title>
<author fullname='B. Laurie' initials='B.' surname='Laurie'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='G. Sisson' initials='G.' surname='Sisson'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='R. Arends' initials='R.' surname='Arends'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='D. Blacka' initials='D.' surname='Blacka'><organization/></author>
<date month='March' year='2008'/>
<abstract><t>The Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) Extensions introduced the NSEC resource record (RR) for authenticated denial of existence. This document introduces an alternative resource record, NSEC3, which similarly provides authenticated denial of existence.  However, it also provides measures against zone enumeration and permits gradual expansion of delegation-centric zones.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='5155'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC5155'/>
</reference>



<reference anchor='RFC5702' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5702'>
<front>
<title>Use of SHA-2 Algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC</title>
<author fullname='J. Jansen' initials='J.' surname='Jansen'><organization/></author>
<date month='October' year='2009'/>
<abstract><t>This document describes how to produce RSA/SHA-256 and RSA/SHA-512 DNSKEY and RRSIG resource records for use in the Domain Name System Security Extensions (RFC 4033, RFC 4034, and RFC 4035).  [STANDARDS TRACK]</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='5702'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC5702'/>
</reference>



<reference anchor='RFC6840' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6840'>
<front>
<title>Clarifications and Implementation Notes for DNS Security (DNSSEC)</title>
<author fullname='S. Weiler' initials='S.' role='editor' surname='Weiler'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='D. Blacka' initials='D.' role='editor' surname='Blacka'><organization/></author>
<date month='February' year='2013'/>
<abstract><t>This document is a collection of technical clarifications to the DNS Security (DNSSEC) document set.  It is meant to serve as a resource to implementors as well as a collection of DNSSEC errata that existed at the time of writing.</t><t>This document updates the core DNSSEC documents (RFC 4033, RFC 4034, and RFC 4035) as well as the NSEC3 specification (RFC 5155).  It also defines NSEC3 and SHA-2 (RFC 4509 and RFC 5702) as core parts of the DNSSEC specification.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='6840'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC6840'/>
</reference>




    </references>

    <references title='Informative References'>





<reference anchor='RFC2536' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2536'>
<front>
<title>DSA KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name System (DNS)</title>
<author fullname='D. Eastlake 3rd' initials='D.' surname='Eastlake 3rd'><organization/></author>
<date month='March' year='1999'/>
<abstract><t>A standard method for storing US Government Digital Signature Algorithm keys and signatures in the Domain Name System is described which utilizes DNS KEY and SIG resource records.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='2536'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC2536'/>
</reference>



<reference anchor='RFC5011' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5011'>
<front>
<title>Automated Updates of DNS Security (DNSSEC) Trust Anchors</title>
<author fullname='M. StJohns' initials='M.' surname='StJohns'><organization/></author>
<date month='September' year='2007'/>
<abstract><t>This document describes a means for automated, authenticated, and authorized updating of DNSSEC &quot;trust anchors&quot;.  The method provides protection against N-1 key compromises of N keys in the trust point key set.  Based on the trust established by the presence of a current anchor, other anchors may be added at the same place in the hierarchy, and, ultimately, supplant the existing anchor(s).</t><t>This mechanism will require changes to resolver management behavior (but not resolver resolution behavior), and the addition of a single flag bit to the DNSKEY record.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='STD' value='74'/>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='5011'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC5011'/>
</reference>



<reference anchor='RFC5933' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5933'>
<front>
<title>Use of GOST Signature Algorithms in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC</title>
<author fullname='V. Dolmatov' initials='V.' role='editor' surname='Dolmatov'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='A. Chuprina' initials='A.' surname='Chuprina'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='I. Ustinov' initials='I.' surname='Ustinov'><organization/></author>
<date month='July' year='2010'/>
<abstract><t>This document describes how to produce digital signatures and hash functions using the GOST R 34.10-2001 and GOST R 34.11-94 algorithms for DNSKEY, RRSIG, and DS resource records, for use in the Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC).  [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='5933'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC5933'/>
</reference>



<reference anchor='RFC6014' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6014'>
<front>
<title>Cryptographic Algorithm Identifier Allocation for DNSSEC</title>
<author fullname='P. Hoffman' initials='P.' surname='Hoffman'><organization/></author>
<date month='November' year='2010'/>
<abstract><t>This document specifies how DNSSEC cryptographic algorithm identifiers in the IANA registries are allocated.  It changes the requirement from &quot;standard required&quot; to &quot;RFC Required&quot;.  It does not change the list of algorithms that are recommended or required for DNSSEC implementations.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='6014'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC6014'/>
</reference>



<reference anchor='RFC6605' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6605'>
<front>
<title>Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) for DNSSEC</title>
<author fullname='P. Hoffman' initials='P.' surname='Hoffman'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='W.C.A. Wijngaards' initials='W.C.A.' surname='Wijngaards'><organization/></author>
<date month='April' year='2012'/>
<abstract><t>This document describes how to specify Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) keys and signatures in DNS Security (DNSSEC).  It lists curves of different sizes and uses the SHA-2 family of hashes for signatures.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='6605'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC6605'/>
</reference>



<reference anchor='RFC6781' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6781'>
<front>
<title>DNSSEC Operational Practices, Version 2</title>
<author fullname='O. Kolkman' initials='O.' surname='Kolkman'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='W. Mekking' initials='W.' surname='Mekking'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='R. Gieben' initials='R.' surname='Gieben'><organization/></author>
<date month='December' year='2012'/>
<abstract><t>This document describes a set of practices for operating the DNS with security extensions (DNSSEC).  The target audience is zone administrators deploying DNSSEC.</t><t>The document discusses operational aspects of using keys and signatures in the DNS.  It discusses issues of key generation, key storage, signature generation, key rollover, and related policies.</t><t>This document obsoletes RFC 4641, as it covers more operational ground and gives more up-to-date requirements with respect to key sizes and the DNSSEC operations.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='6781'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC6781'/>
</reference>



<reference anchor='RFC7344' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7344'>
<front>
<title>Automating DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance</title>
<author fullname='W. Kumari' initials='W.' surname='Kumari'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='O. Gudmundsson' initials='O.' surname='Gudmundsson'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='G. Barwood' initials='G.' surname='Barwood'><organization/></author>
<date month='September' year='2014'/>
<abstract><t>This document describes a method to allow DNS Operators to more easily update DNSSEC Key Signing Keys using the DNS as a communication channel.  The technique described is aimed at delegations in which it is currently hard to move information from the Child to Parent.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='7344'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC7344'/>
</reference>



<reference anchor='RFC8078' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8078'>
<front>
<title>Managing DS Records from the Parent via CDS/CDNSKEY</title>
<author fullname='O. Gudmundsson' initials='O.' surname='Gudmundsson'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='P. Wouters' initials='P.' surname='Wouters'><organization/></author>
<date month='March' year='2017'/>
<abstract><t>RFC 7344 specifies how DNS trust can be maintained across key rollovers in-band between parent and child.  This document elevates RFC 7344 from Informational to Standards Track.  It also adds a method for initial trust setup and removal of a secure entry point.</t><t>Changing a domain's DNSSEC status can be a complicated matter involving multiple unrelated parties.  Some of these parties, such as the DNS operator, might not even be known by all the organizations involved.  The inability to disable DNSSEC via in-band signaling is seen as a problem or liability that prevents some DNSSEC adoption at a large scale.  This document adds a method for in-band signaling of these DNSSEC status changes.</t><t>This document describes reasonable policies to ease deployment of the initial acceptance of new secure entry points (DS records).</t><t>It is preferable that operators collaborate on the transfer or move of a domain.  The best method is to perform a Key Signing Key (KSK) plus Zone Signing Key (ZSK) rollover.  If that is not possible, the method using an unsigned intermediate state described in this document can be used to move the domain between two parties.  This leaves the domain temporarily unsigned and vulnerable to DNS spoofing, but that is preferred over the alternative of validation failures due to a mismatched DS and DNSKEY record.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='8078'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC8078'/>
</reference>



<reference anchor='RFC8080' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8080'>
<front>
<title>Edwards-Curve Digital Security Algorithm (EdDSA) for DNSSEC</title>
<author fullname='O. Sury' initials='O.' surname='Sury'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='R. Edmonds' initials='R.' surname='Edmonds'><organization/></author>
<date month='February' year='2017'/>
<abstract><t>This document describes how to specify Edwards-curve Digital Security Algorithm (EdDSA) keys and signatures in DNS Security (DNSSEC).  It uses EdDSA with the choice of two curves: Ed25519 and Ed448.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='8080'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC8080'/>
</reference>



<reference anchor='RFC8198' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8198'>
<front>
<title>Aggressive Use of DNSSEC-Validated Cache</title>
<author fullname='K. Fujiwara' initials='K.' surname='Fujiwara'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='A. Kato' initials='A.' surname='Kato'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='W. Kumari' initials='W.' surname='Kumari'><organization/></author>
<date month='July' year='2017'/>
<abstract><t>The DNS relies upon caching to scale; however, the cache lookup generally requires an exact match.  This document specifies the use of NSEC/NSEC3 resource records to allow DNSSEC-validating resolvers to generate negative answers within a range and positive answers from wildcards.  This increases performance, decreases latency, decreases resource utilization on both authoritative and recursive servers, and increases privacy.  Also, it may help increase resilience to certain DoS attacks in some circumstances.</t><t>This document updates RFC 4035 by allowing validating resolvers to generate negative answers based upon NSEC/NSEC3 records and positive answers in the presence of wildcards.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='8198'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC8198'/>
</reference>



<reference anchor='RFC8624' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8624'>
<front>
<title>Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance for DNSSEC</title>
<author fullname='P. Wouters' initials='P.' surname='Wouters'><organization/></author>
<author fullname='O. Sury' initials='O.' surname='Sury'><organization/></author>
<date month='June' year='2019'/>
<abstract><t>The DNSSEC protocol makes use of various cryptographic algorithms in order to provide authentication of DNS data and proof of nonexistence.  To ensure interoperability between DNS resolvers and DNS authoritative servers, it is necessary to specify a set of algorithm implementation requirements and usage guidelines to ensure that there is at least one algorithm that all implementations support.  This document defines the current algorithm implementation requirements and usage guidance for DNSSEC.  This document obsoletes RFC 6944.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='8624'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC8624'/>
</reference>



<reference anchor='RFC9077' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9077'>
<front>
<title>NSEC and NSEC3: TTLs and Aggressive Use</title>
<author fullname='P. van Dijk' initials='P.' surname='van Dijk'><organization/></author>
<date month='July' year='2021'/>
<abstract><t>Due to a combination of unfortunate wording in earlier documents, aggressive use of NSEC and NSEC3 records may deny the existence of names far beyond the intended lifetime of a denial. This document changes the definition of the NSEC and NSEC3 TTL to correct that situation. This document updates RFCs 4034, 4035, 5155, and 8198.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='9077'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC9077'/>
</reference>



<reference anchor='RFC9157' target='https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9157'>
<front>
<title>Revised IANA Considerations for DNSSEC</title>
<author fullname='P. Hoffman' initials='P.' surname='Hoffman'><organization/></author>
<date month='December' year='2021'/>
<abstract><t>This document changes the review requirements needed to get DNSSEC algorithms and resource records added to IANA registries. It updates RFC 6014 to include hash algorithms for Delegation Signer (DS) records and NextSECure version 3 (NSEC3) parameters (for Hashed Authenticated Denial of Existence). It also updates RFCs 5155 and 6014, which have requirements for DNSSEC algorithms, and updates RFC 8624 to clarify the implementation recommendation related to the algorithms described in RFCs that are not on the standards track. The rationale for these changes is to bring the requirements for DS records and hash algorithms used in NSEC3 in line with the requirements for all other DNSSEC algorithms.</t></abstract>
</front>
<seriesInfo name='RFC' value='9157'/>
<seriesInfo name='DOI' value='10.17487/RFC9157'/>
</reference>




    </references>



  </back>

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</rfc>

